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ABSTRACT
This paper is a study of Soviet attitudes toward 
nuclear war and nuclear weapons from 1956 to 1984, as 
reflected in public speeches, books, and articles. 
Secondarily, it is an examination of the various 
opinions on Soviet doctrine found in the American literature.
While the Soviets maintain that there are no 
disagreements on doctrine, this paper finds that there are 
many discrepancies. Foremost are the divergent views held by 
the military and the Party leadership.
To illustrate these differences, the attitudes of the 
military and the Party leadership are traced through the 
years and then compared at several points.
It is suggested that the confusion which exists in 
Soviet doctrine is a result of many ends being pursued 
through the single means of doctrine. This study also 
indicates that inter-service rivalry and disagreement over 
resource allocations partially determine the content of 
Soviet doctrine.
SOVIET NUCLEAR DOCTRINE: 
PERSPECTIVES AND PURPOSES
INTRODUCTION
The 1980's are a turning point in matters of nuclear 
armament. New generations of weapons are being developed and 
deployed while arms control has failed to please anyone. The 
debate on what we should do goes on at all levels of society. 
At the base of each suggestion lies some conception of the 
Soviet Union and how the Soviets approach nuclear war. The 
greatly contrasting American opinions on Soviet doctrine 
prompted me to see for myself what the Soviets have to say 
about nuclear war.
Although the Soviets insist there is a sharp division 
between doctrine and strategy I chose to include them as one 
category. They are very closely related and the distinctions 
are not always clear. Any strategy is necessarily based on 
assumptions that are doctrinal, whether they are presented as 
such or not.
According to the Soviet definitions there is only one 
doctrine, and it sets forth the state's officially adopted 
views on the nature and character of possible future wars, as 
well as how the state will prepare to meet these threats. 
Strategic theory forms part of military science, which is the
2
3system of knowledge about the nature and laws of war, 
preparation for war, and the methods of waging it. Doctrine 
is supposedly defined by the party leadership, who consider 
economics and politics as well as military science in their 
formulations. Military science is the perogative of the 
General Staff. While there should be no disagreement in 
doctrine, it is allowed or even encouraged in military 
science. However, the direction of inquiry pursued in 
military science is supposedly determined by doctrine. If 
this is so then there should be no disagreement between the 
two.
Soviet doctrine can not be ordered in a neatly bound 
volume but must be hunted down. There is disagreement on 
what "counts" and what does not. My solution was to count 
all statements which dealt with the topic. I found that 
while there are some divisions within each major grouping 
that there are two "schools of thought," which I have labeled 
military and political. The military view of doctrine was 
obtained from the works of active and retired Soviet 
officers. American authors such as Harriet F. Scott and 
Richard Pipes consider this to be the full extent of Soviet 
doctrine.
The political view of doctrine was obtained almost 
exclusively from speeches by the First (or General) Secretary 
to the Party Congress meetings between 1956 and 1981. The 
best justification of this as doctrine is the relevance of
4the material and the obvious importance of the persons 
involved. It is also worth noting again that Soviet 
definitions stress the dominance of the political side of 
doctrine.
"Nuclear doctrine" is my term and does not reflect 
Soviet usage. Similiarly, I use the word "doctrine" where I 
should properly say "doctrine and strategy." This is for 
convenience only and wherever distinction between the two is 
needed I have made it clear.
I begin with the roots of current Soviet military 
concepts and trace the development of military thought on 
nuclear war from 1953 to the present. In chapter two 
political positions on nuclear war and how they have changed 
are presented. Chapter three compares political and military 
positions from the same time frames in an attempt to 
illustrate the differences involved. The possible 
motivations behind different doctrinal positions are examined 
in chapter four to illustrate that this is not simply a 
military matter, but necessarily involves the complexities of 
domestic and international politics. In the concluding 
remarks I briefly summarize the military and party leadership 
views of doctrine, and express my own opinion on some of the 
points raised in this paper.
CHAPTER I 
SOVIET DOCTRINE: THE MILITARY VIEW
A. The Basics of Soviet Doctrine and Strategy
Although the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear 
bomb in 1949, no theoretical discussion concerning the impact 
of nuclear weapons on warfare happened during Stalin's 
lifetime. Only months after his death the first stirrings of 
a reassessment occurred with an article in Military Thought 
which implied that his permanently operating factors were not 
basic. These five factors—  stability of the rear, morale of 
the army, quantity and quality of divisions, armaments of the 
army, and organizing ability of command personnel—  were 
elevated to near sacred status by Stalin, and as a result new 
military ideas were not discussed.
By 1956 most military theoreticians had rejected 
Stalin's views, and his five factors were reduced to common 
sense principles rather than holy commandments. That same 
year Khrushchev announced there was no longer any fatal 
inevitability of war.* The establishment of the 
non-inevitability of war between opposing social systems 
marks the beginning of the revolution in military affairs. 
This major change away from Stalinist precepts on war was
5
6well established by the 21st Party Congress in 1961.
However, turning away from Stalin did not include 
turning away from the great military theoreticians of the 
past. The main strategic concepts of the Soviet military 
today were formed in the 1930's, and successfully or not have 
been applied to the nuclear environment. These concepts 
include:
1. Commitment to a general balance among the different 
branches of service and close cooperation among them 
in battle.
2. Rejection of excessive reliance on any single weapon 
or branch.
3. Emphasis upon mass both for forces in being and in 
battle.
4. Stress upon the importance of maintaining the 
initiative and a belief in the offensive as 
the decisive form of combat.
5. Preference for geographically extensive and highly 
mobile operations.
The top-level reassessment of military thinking ordered 
in 1956 soon concluded that nuclear missiles would be 
decisive in any future war. In accordance with this decision 
the military published many works exploring nuclear war 
issues during the 1960's. Purely conventional war 
possibilities received no more than a perfunctory mention for 
several years. These early works have been modified in later 
writings, but to a large extent are still relevant to Soviet 
military thinking.
Presented here is a summary of the doctrine formulated
7and refined between 1956 and 1984 by the Soviet military.
The following list of assumptions, goals, and means of 
achieving goals is drawn from Sokolovskiy1s Military 
Strategy, and statements by Marshall Malinovsky. I believe 
it accurately depicts the Soviet military writings of the 
1960's as a whole.
ASSUMPTIONS
-War between the superpowers will escalate to general nuclear 
war if they become involved in a local conflict.
-Nuclear war is most likely to begin with massive, possibly 
surprise, nuclear rocket strikes.
5
-Capitalism will start the war if there is one.
-The initial stages of a nuclear war will be decisive.6
7
-Victory is possible.
o
-Nuclear rockets will be the decisive weapon.
GOALS
-Total defeat of the armed forces of the enemy. 
-"Disorganisation" of the enemy's interior zone.
-Suppression of the enemy's will to resist.
-Aid to the people to free them from the yoke of imperialism.
g
-Successful repulsion of attack by any aggressor.
MEANS OF ACHIEVING GOALS
PRE-WAR
-The building of superior armed forces in all respects. 
Quantitative, qualitative-Qdoctrinal and strategic thought 
superiority are included.
-Readiness. "Soviet military doctrine considers the most 
important, the main and paramount task of the Armed Forces to
8be in constant readiness for the reliable repulse of a 
surprise,attack of the enemy and to frustrate his criminal 
plans."
ONCE WAR STARTS
-"Mass nuclear rocket strikes will be of decisive importance 
for the attainment of goals in future world war. The 
infliction of these assaults will be the main, decisive 
method of waging war."
-"These troops (Strategic Rocket Forces) can, if necessary, 
be used for the solution of the main strategic missions of 
the war, the destruction of the aggressor's means of nuclear 
attack -- the basis of his military might—  for the 
destruction of the main groupings of his armed forces, as 
well as for the destruction of all vitally important enemy 
objectives."
-"The execution of these tasks by the Rocket Troops will 
create the conditions for conducting successful operations by 
other services of the Armed Forces, for defending the 
interior of the country against enemy nuclear attack and for 
rapidly attaining the militaryjgolitical and strategic goals 
of the war and final victory."
In the pre-war period the economy is of prime
importance in preparing for war. Once war starts, military
15imperatives become decisive. The primary source of 
military strength is the nuclear rocket; the path to 
military victory is through defeat of the enemy's nuclear 
rocket force.
Reading the military works that present these ideas 
often lends an aggressive tint to Soviet thinking. This 
impression is reinforced by references to preemptive strikes.
In this regard (decisiveness of the initial 
period) the main problem is the development
9of methods for reliably repelling a surprise 
nuclear attack as well as methods of 
frustrating the aggressive designs of the 
enemy by the timely infliction of a 
shattering attack upon him.
Taken out of context this statement seems threatening; but,
if taken as a whole, Soviet doctrine is clearly defensively
oriented although this is often to be achieved through
offensive action. This combination of a defensive doctrine
with an offensive strategy has proven troublesome to both the
writers and the readers of Soviet doctrine. Among the
defensive features are the lack of any statements advocating
a nuclear war and outright condemnation of preventive wars.
Preemption is presented as a defensive measure to be taken
17only when it is certain the enemy is preparing to strike.
Westerners find Soviet references to the possibility of 
victory a disturbing aspect of Soviet thought, and indicative 
of Soviet willingness to start a nuclear war. However, 
believing that victory is theoretically possible and 
believing one actually possesses that ability are different 
matters. Soviet writings concluded victory was a possibility 
very early, when the USSR was markedly inferior in nuclear 
weapons. Also, Soviet writings note the certainty of 
enormous losses in a nuclear war, even for the victor. Even 
so, the feasibility of fighting and winning a general nuclear 
war, should one be foisted upon them, is the subject matter 
of Soviet military writings.
10
B. Doctrinal Modifications
Several doctrinal modifications occurred between 1960
and 1968. In the third edition of Military Strategy.
published in 1968, the most widespread change occurred in
chapter two, which deals with Western perceptions and
theories. These changes have been explained both as an
analysis of "flexible response" and as a front for allowing
the author to discuss views and ideas which can not be
presented as his own. A more specific change is the
elevation of nuclear rocket submarines to equality with the
18strategic rocket forces. Aid to nonsocialist states
fallen victim to imperialist aggression is upgraded from
19"support" to "military support."
Changes in other works support and go beyond the
changes found in Sokolovskiy. An important change from the
fourth to the fifth edition of Marxism- Leninism on War and
the Army reads... "(doctrine) does not deny the important
significance of other kinds of weapons..." to "...the
possibility in certain circumstances of conducting combat
20actions without the use of the nuclear weapon."
The change here is in the type of war being considered. 
While the nuclear revolution overshadowed conventional forces 
the military always maintained that they remained essential. 
Previous to this conventional forces were depicted in a 
follow-up role. They were to be employed in the wake of the
11
massive nuclear exchange which would both begin the war and
accomplish the main strategic missions. Assuming that even
one battle could remain fully conventional represents a
significant increase in the role of conventional forces, and
additional complexity in the role of nuclear weapons. That
same year Communist of the Armed Forces carried an article
which said:
The point is that the new possibilities of 
waging armed struggle (meaning for using 
conventional forces) have arisen not in spite 
of, but because of, the nuclear missile 
weapons••.
In 1974 Marshall Grechko gave more explicit support to
wars of national liberation, and revealed a Soviet desire to
project military power. Earlier works are concerned solely
with the defense of the Soviet Union.
At the present stage the historic function of 
the Soviet Armed Forces is not restricted to 
their function in defending our Motherland 
and the other socialist countries.••
..(the Soviet State) supports the national 
liberation struggle, and resolutely resist 
imperialists' aggression in whateve^distant 
region of our planet it may appear.
The articles and books of Admiral Gorshkov during this same
time period deal at length with the need to project military
power abroad, and the usefulness of a strong navy in this
regard.
A change with many implications relating to both the 
non-inevitability theme and the possibility of victory is the 
changing assessment of the general character of a future war.
12
In the early 1960's war is seen as not inevitable, but if a
war occurs it would inevitably be a world nuclear rocket war,
and would almost certainly begin with mass nuclear rocket
strikes. In the late 1960's the scenario became complicated
with the idea that a war might open with a conventional
phase, but would inevitably escalate to a general nuclear
war. By 1979 the possibility of a purely conventional
23superpower war is being contemplated. In a book published
in 1982 purely conventional war discussion is introduced as a
new principle and a response to Western theories of
24escalation control.
Additional weight is lent to conventional-only ideas by
a 1984 interview with Marshall Ogarkov in which he says that
the decreasing possibilities for a disarming first-strike and
the increasing size of nuclear arsenals have combined to make
nuclear war very unlikely. The Marshall goes on to suggest
that a future war will most likely be fought by conventional
forces armed with the latest in high-technology; including
weapons based on new principles, whose accuracy and power
will bring them much closer to weapons of mass destruction
25than any current conventional weapons.
Although the military is heavily involved in the arms
control process no theoretical literature on the subject has 
26emerged. I think it is safe to say that the military 
accepts arms control grudgingly and with suspicion.
13
C. The Dissenting View
Not all theoreticians of the 1960's subscribed to the 
views outlined above. Disagreement over the focus of 
doctrine is evident from statements such as this one from 
Major General Nikolai Talenskiy in 1965. (He was editor of 
Military Thought in the 1950's, retired from the military in 
1958),27
In our days there is no more dangerous 
illusion than the idea that thermonuclear war 
can still serve as an instrument of politics, 
that it is possible to achieve political aims 
by using2guclear weapons and still 
survive.
By questioning the possibility of victory Talenskiy brings 
the whole basis of Soviet military doctrine into question.
It is not clear to me whether he is referring to just the 
(then) present nuclear balance or recommending a future 
course of action.
It is possible to see the current situation as 
unwinnable but to still believe it is proper to pursue a 
course of action which may make victory achievable. Another 
course would be to assume that the situation is basically 
unchangeable, making the lack of victory a permanent feature. 
One could also believe that pursuing victory is dangerous in 
itself, and likely to lead to war, independent of beliefs on 
the possibility of victory.
Talenskiy seems to be challenging the focus on striving
14
for a war winning capability. By denying the political 
utility of nuclear war he challenges the Marxist analysis on 
the nature of war, (which defines war by class essence, not 
types of weapons) and the impact of nuclear weapons on war.
To the adherents of the more traditional line the main change 
brought about by nuclear weapons lies in their ability to 
achieve strategic missions directly, without relying on the 
cumulative effects of tactics and operations. Nuclear war is 
seen as other wars are seen—  a rather destructive way of 
achieving political goals.
Talenskiy says nuclear war can not serve political
ends. Other statements are more clearly descriptive and do
not necessarily challenge the theoretical possibility of
victory, although that may have been their intent.
Everyone knows that in contemporary 
conditions in an armed conflict of 
adversaries comparatively equal in power (in 
number and especially in quality of weapons) 
an immediate retaliatory strike of enormous 
destructive power is inevitable.
With the existing level of development of 
nuclear missile weapons and their reliable 
cover below ground and under water it is 
impossible in practice to destroy them 
completely, and consequently it is also 
impossible to prevent an annihilating 
retaliatory strike.
The key phrases are "contemporary conditions" and 
"existing level of development." Mr. Garthoff picked these 
passages from Military Thought as those most supportive of 
his argument that the Soviets wish to maintain mutual
15
deterrence. However, they merely describe their author*s 
perception of the then existing nuclear balance, without 
making recommendations. It is entirely consistent to 
recognize the existing situation as one of mutual deterrence 
on one page and extoll the merits of striving for 
superiority/ victory on another, if it is believed that 
mutual deterrence is a temporary, not necessary, relationship 
between large nuclear powers. This means that while Mr. 
Garthoff has shown that some Soviets accept the current 
situation as one of mutual deterrence, he does not show that 
they wish to maintain such a relationship.
Throughout the 1960's the Soviet military fully 
maintained the view that nuclear war can be successfully 
waged. Superior forces are seen as both necessary and 
realistically achievable. While Talenskiy has the military 
background to qualify as military, he was not on active duty 
anymore. Even Talenskiy does not support a minimum deterrent 
view, which could be arrived at from the above quotes. It 
would seem that equality as an acceptable minimum is the most 
radical view that can be inferred, and this only outside the 
actual military establishment. More often seen is the 
sentiment that weapons in the West are a threat to mankind 
while weapons in the hands of socialists further the cause of 
peace.
16
D. American Views Contrasted
Understanding of Soviet Doctrine is hampered by the 
difference in concepts used and the basically different frame 
of reference that the Soviets use in examining these issues. 
Two differing assessments of Soviet intentions based on their 
doctrine provide a useful contrast.
The Garthoff assessment:
1. The Soviets see deterrence as their principal military 
ta'sk.
2. The Soviets believe there is an overall balance.
3. The Soviets wish to maintain this balance (parity as a 
goal).
4. The Soviets believe negotiations can help maintain the 
balance.
The Pipes assessment:
1. The Soviets seek victory, not deterrence.
2. The Soviets seek superiority, not sufficiency.
3. The Soviets study the offensive, not retaliation.
4. Soviet doctrine has 5 main elements: pre-emption, 
superiority, counterforce, combined arms, and defense- 
Balance, negotiate, and sufficiency are not present.
Even among authors as divergent as these two there is 
some agreement. Both agree that the Soviets see the current 
situation as one of mutual deterrence, (each side possesses a 
sufficiently large, secure, second strike capability? an 
attacker has nothing to gain) and that war-fighting and 
assured destruction are not mutually exclusive, separable 
strategies to the Soviets.
17
Deterrence is a key concept in thinking about nuclear 
war, but it has developed differently in the U.S. and the 
USSR. The word, deterrence, has no direct equivalent in the 
Russian language. In the 1950's and early 1960's 
sderzhivanie (keeping out) is used to describe Soviet policy 
while ustrashenie (intimidation) is often used to describe 
Western deterrence. Since the 1960's ustrashenie has seldom 
been used. The English words deterrence and containment both 
translate to sderzhivanie, thus confusing two distinct 
concepts•
This little language problem is indicative of the 
confusion in this area. Garthoff is correct when he asserts 
the principal task of the Soviet forces is deterrence. 
However, the Soviets consider the best deterrent to be the 
ability to win. This idea belongs to what I would call 
traditional military thinking and is not strongly related to 
the Western intellectual concepts of mutual deterrence and 
stability, which are products of the peculiarities of nuclear 
weapons.
The concepts of mutual deterrence and stability are not 
present in Soviet writings. Mutual deterrence (a belief by 
the Soviets that America should maintain a credible deterrent 
and vice versa) is not a desirable goal the Soviets pursue, 
but a situation which they agree currently exists. Mutual 
deterrence as elaborated in MAD theory is the best_ possible 
solution. No Soviet writings endorse this concept.
18
Deterrence to the Soviets is not something to be pursued but
rather a by-product of successfully performed military and
33political/diplomatic tasks.
To say that deterrent and war-fighting strategies are
not dichotomous to the Soviets might imply that they are in
the U.S. way of thinking, but that is not true. Some
U.S. officials view the relation between deterrence and
war-fighting capabilities much the same as the Soviets. In
his Fiscal Year 1981 posture statement Secretary of Defense
Brown said:
There is no contradiction between this 
attention to the militarily effective 
targeting of the large and flexible forces we 
increasingly possess— to how we could fight a 
war, if need be— and our primary^and 
overriding policy of deterrence.
Elsewhere in the same statement Brown contends (contrary to
popular belief) that the U.S. has never pursued a deterrent
strategy to the exclusion of a war-fighting strategy.
It has never been U.S. policy to limit 
ourselves to massive counter-city operations 
in retaliation, nor have our plans been so 
circumscribed. For nearly twenty years, we 
have explicitly included a range of 
employment options•..
....In particular, we have always considered 
it important, in the event of war, to be able 
to attack the forces that could do-damage to 
the United States and its allies.
Pipes' assertion is also correct. Soviet doctrine 
calls for the ability to win, since such ability is seen as 
the best deterrent to aggression. To repeat myself somewhat,
19
one must bear in mind that desiring the ability to win is not
the same as believing it has been achieved, and does not
necessarily imply a willingness to use such an ability should 
it be achieved.
The Soviet concept of deterrence seems identical to the 
traditional concept of defense. Defense is best achieved by 
having forces clearly capable of emerging victorious from any 
conceivable conflict. While nuclear weapons have given rise 
to new ideas the age old conception of defense has not been 
discarded by either side. Developed in a pre-atomic world, 
the concept of defense is very much at odds with ideas such 
as mutual vulnerability being an acceptable state of affairs.
On the question of maintaining the balance, Garthoff
says the Soviets want to keep it while Pipes argues they
desire superiority and study offensive possibilities, not
retaliation. While it is true that most Soviets accept that
a rough balance exists (in the form of minimal first strike
incentive on both sides), none see it any more favorably than
an acceptable minimum. David Holloway states this clearly in
The Soviet Union and the Arms Race.
The Soviets would not accept an inferior 
position, therefore an assured destruction 
capability was not enough. Both the ambition 
to attain superiority and the recognition of 
mutual vulnerability were present in Soviet 
thinking in the 60*s but a choice became 
necessary only with the attainment of parity.
The choice was not one of principles, for 
clearly superiority would be desirable. It 
was forced by the practical considerations
20
that pursuit of superiority might prove 
extremely costly, and ultimately 
unsuccessful*
Parity, equivalence, or a balance became desirable to 
the Soviets as the best political solution available at the 
moment. Military writings continue to worry about problems 
such as the possibility of defense and victory, and parity 
provides no help to them. Military figures show little 
enthusiasm for parity. On the other hand, there is a clear 
trend in political statements showing a shift from advocacy 
of superiority to acceptance of parity.
Acceptance of parity does not mean the Soviets accepted 
the absolute value of deterrence. War could still happen, 
and the military must be prepared. This is why Pipes' 
assertion concerning study of the offensive is true. Much 
Soviet literature does concern itself with the possibilities 
of offensive nuclear operations. This is not necessarily an 
indication of aggressive thinking, as Pipes suggests, but the 
result of certain assumptions. Soviet doctrine assumes that 
a nuclear war might be launched by the West. If deterrence 
fails what do you do? Retaliation is useful only as a 
threat. Once the threat fails and the enemy launches a 
nuclear strike retaliation will not remedy the situation. It 
is nothing more than revenge.
The question of how to fight and win a war generally 
means a study of offensive possibilities. Purely defensive
21
operations by their nature offer no answers on how to defeat 
the enemy and end the war. Because of the immense 
destructive power of nuclear weapons, winning means 
preventing the enemy from launching any sizable portion of 
his missiles (given the lack of ABM systems). This means 
either preventive war or a preemptive strike. Preventive war 
is what the Soviets accuse the West of plotting and 
specifically denounce in their writings. Since the Soviets 
assume the West will "begin" the war a preemptive strike is 
their only "defense."
The Soviet attitude toward negotiations and arms 
control is another point of contention. The record of 
agreements is testimony to their sincerity, but motivations 
are hard to determine. Statements of ideology seem the best 
guide here, for I have not found a rationale of arms control 
per se. The Soviets do not actively seek to maintain parity 
through negotiations. They want the best deal possible and 
would accept an advantage. They negotiate for their own 
benefit, not ours. Negotiations are seen as an adversary 
relationship, with each side out only for itself, not as a 
conscious attempt to maintain MAD criteria.
Arms control does not mitigate the historical struggle 
between capitalism and communism and does not signify 
acceptance of the status quo. Nuclear doctrine reflects the 
idea that these two ideologies are competing, that the 
superior nature of socialism assures its victory, and that
22
this victory cannot be prevented by the capitalists launching 
a nuclear war.
Further insight into the Soviet view can be obtained 
from the two terms "correlation of forces" and "equal 
security." Both somewhat reflect the Soviet mindset. Equal 
security is mainly an arms control term. It expresses the 
Soviet desire to account for more factors than bilateral bean 
counting allows. The entire range of strategic questions (as 
defined by the Soviets) are to be considered together. t The 
Soviets include Europe and their Eastern borders in strategic 
calculations and, not surprisingly, wish to offset NATO and 
Chinese weapons. The effect of this approach is to allow the 
USSR more weapons than the U.S. due to our having nuclear 
friends while Russia does not. Although this is undoubtedly 
used as a negotiating tactic, it also reflects a Soviet 
fondness for the macro view.
Correlation of forces is the term used to denote the 
total power distribution in the world. The quality of 
planning, morale of the troops and nation, justness of the 
cause, choosing the proper moment, geography, and economic 
success are among the factors affecting the correlation of 
forces. Weapons are a factor but are not seen as 
overshadowing all others.
Soviet references to victory are often in the same vein 
as these terms. Victory is seen as coming not just from
23
military prowess, but from the superiority of the socialist 
system. In the Soviet view war is not just a military 
contest, but a political and social system contest.
Everything is at stake; everything plays a role in the 
outcome. The possibilities for and capabilities of the armed 
forces are inextricably linked to the society they serve.
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CHAPTER II 
ANOTHER VIEW OF DOCTRINE
The proper relationship between the military and the 
party leadership is laid out in the Soviet definitions of 
doctrine and military science. Doctrine is a political 
perogativef but counts military science among the factors 
considered in its formulation. Doctrine is supposed to 
provide guidelines for the further development of military 
science. As I understand it, this subordination of military 
science to doctrine means that military science should be 
looking for ways to implement the politically determined 
doctrine.
In this chapter I will examine the speeches of the 
First (or General) Secretary to each Party Congress between 
1956 and 1981 to determine the position of the Party 
leadership on nuclear war issues. Speeches to the Party 
Congress are appropriate because they present a position 
worked out among the top leaders for dissemination to the 
whole Party and nation. Such speeches would not be designed 
for Western consumption.
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For clarity and ease of comparison it seems best to 
present each Congress speech separately by the position taken 
on several recurring themes. This method will allow 
isolation of the interesting elements. As with the writings 
examined in chapter one, important changes can occur with 
only two or three words. Sometimes a speech is more notable 
for what it does not say than for what it does. The five 
themes I will examine are closely interrelated. When 
possible I will present them as discrete ideas, but 
especially for the later Congresses this is not possible.
The five themes are:
1. General assessment of the international scene.
This is taken largely from the opening section which 
sets the tone of each Congress. Where appropriate, 
statements from later sections are included.
2. Attitude towards the arms race.
a. who is at fault?
b. proposed action concerning.
c. perceived effects of.
3. Likelihood of nuclear war occurring.
a. forces pushing for war.
b. forces against war and relative importance of each.
4. Expected results should a nuclear war occur.
a. Is victory possible?
b. Level of destruction involved.
5. Attitude toward negotiation.
a. Are proposals specific?
b. Are they mentioned once or often?
c. What importance is attached to them in general 
and specific terms?
The 20th Party Congress (1956)
Khrushchev summarizes the three years after Stalin*s
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death in 1953 as a period of tension giving way to relaxation 
at some point prior to the Congress. The easing of tension 
is attributed to the policies of the Soviet Union and friends 
while the West is blamed for the arms race, the cold war, and 
pursuing a "positions of strength" policy. In general the 
imperialists have been aggravating international 
relations
In blaming the arms race on the U.S., Khrushchev cites
the recent jSoviet troop reductions and several Soviet
proposals as evidence of Soviet good intentions. The
proposals mentioned include a nuclear weapons test ban. The
arms race is condemned only on the grounds that it increases
the probability of war. After noting the failure of the West
to respond adequately to Russia's desire for disarmament
Khrushchev states:
The peace-loving states naturally had to draw 
appropriate conclusions from this situation 
and to continue reinforcing the security of 
their countries.
At this Congress Khrushchev introduces the idea that
war is no longer to be considered inevitable, although as
long as imperialism exists the possibility of war remains.
Imperialism is said to be weakened while the forces of
socialism grow ever stronger. The primary force preventing
war is the working people of the world.
If the working class comes out as a united, 
organized force and acts with firm 
resolution, there will be no war.
Now there is a world camp of socialism which 
has become a mighty force. In this camp the 
peace forces have not only the moral but also 
the material means to prevent aggression.
Khrushchev makes some rather strong comments on the
probable results of nuclear war that are somewhat confused.
Rather than attempt to sort out the pieces a rather long
quote seems appropriate.
Should their (capitalist countries) rulers 
dare to precipitate such a war, the working 
class and the broad masses of working people 
of the capitalist countries would undoubtedly 
draw decisive conclusions regarding a system 
which periodically plunges the nations into 
the bloodbath of war.
It is not by chance that in recent 
times prominent bourgeois figures more and 
more often admit frankly "there can be no 
victor in an atomic war." These public 
figures still do not venture to state that 
capitalism will find its grave in another 
world war, should it unleash one, but they 
are already obliged to admit openly that the 
socialist camp is invincible.
However confusing the details of this statement might be it
clearly gives the USSR the upper hand in a nuclear conflict.
Not a lot of space is devoted to negotiations, but they 
are said to be the method by which international relations 
should be conducted. Specific proposals include a nuclear 
weapons test ban, no nuclear weapons in the two Germanies, 
and mutual military budget cuts. These and other measures 
are presented as a hopeful first step toward general 
disarmament.
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21st Congress 1959
Rather than review the period since the 20th Congress 
Khrushchev opens with predictions of how the coming seven 
year plan will affect international relations. The general 
thrust is that the economic superiority of socialism will 
soon become obvious to all, and will have far-reaching 
effects.
The arms race is blamed on the West, but there is no 
mention of Soviet defense expenditures. Condemnation of the 
arms race is solely on economic grounds; no mention of it 
increasing the danger of war is made.
This Congress repeats the previous one regarding the 
likelihood of nuclear war. Although it remains a possibility 
there are "tremendous forces" working against it. The 21st 
Congress seems to be concerned with little besides economic 
plans and possibilities. Khrushchev contends that as a 
result of the coming seven year plan, "there will be created 
real possibilities for eliminating war as a means of settling 
international issues."** The emphasis on the "masses" as a 
force for peace is not present in this speech. Economic 
success is presented as the golden key to all things.
Should the imperialists attempt a nuclear war
36
compels other countries to expend 
considerable funds to strengthen their own 
defenses•
Aggressive American actions are said to have increased
the threat of war. The forces preventing war change somewhat
to give greater credit to the State and Party. The
non-inevitability of war is reaffirmed. The possibility of
peace can only be a reality with "activeness on the part of
20all forces for peace." In a section denouncing the West
German revanchists and their war plans Brezhnev repeats the
idea that nuclear war will be the end of capitalism. He also
stresses the need to prevent a surprise attack, and to ensure
that retaliation "descends on them irrevocably and without 
21delay." Negotiations receive fairly little attention but 
several specific proposals are mentioned. The utility of 
negotiating is to lessen the threat of war and lead to more 
comprehensive agreements.
24th Congress (1971)
The description of international relations as 
confrontation between two lines, one for peace and freedom, 
the other for war and oppression, is nearly identical to the 
22nd and 23rd Congress openings. As always the crisis of 
capitalism has deepened. The unchanging aggressive and 
reactionary nature of capitalism is also repeated.
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Brezhnev gives dollar amounts for U.S. and NATO
military expenditures, and says that "in the post-war years
militarism in the capitalist world has been growing on an
22unprecedented scale." Unlike the 22nd and 23rd there is 
no accompanying statement on what this means to the Soviet 
defense effort. Negotiations are presented as the solution.
We are conducting negotiations with the 
U.S.A. on the limitation of strategic 
armaments. The favorable outcome of these 
talks would make it possible to avoid another 
round in the missile arms race and to free 
substantial resources for constructive 
purposes. We are working toward positive 
results in these negotiations.
The lessening of war danger as a benefit of negotiations is
also mentioned more than once.
The prevention of nuclear war is now said to be "the
24vital task of all peace-loving states, of all peoples."
The international workers movement is now referred to as the
"militant vanguard of the revolutionary forces", but it is
25not mentioned in connection with nuclear war. Brezhnev
sums up the elements preventing war:
We have everything necessary—  an honest 
policy of peace, military might, the 
solidarity of the Soviet people—  to ensure 
the inviolability of our borders against any 
encroachments and to defend the gains of 
socialism.
No mention is made of nuclear war being the end of 
capitalism, and there are no references to how destructive a 
nuclear war might be. Negotiations are the heart of the 
Congress despite the relatively bad characterization of
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imperialism. Brezhnev outlines a "peace program" with all 
the main points depending on negotiations for successful 
implementation. The peace program is supposed to be the 
means for implementing the policy of peaceful coexistence.
25th Congress (1976)
Description of the international climate takes on a
much more optimistic tone in this Congress than in any
previous one.
Although world peace is still by no means 
guaranteedf we have every reason to say with 
confidence that the improvement in the 
international climate is convincing evidence 
that the achievement of lasting peace is not 
merely a good intention but a realistic 
aim.
The above quote is the new improved version of the old "war
is not inevitable" theme, which does not appear at this
Congress. It says basically the same thing but stresses the
possibility of peace rather than of war. Instead of taking
every opportunity to denounce capitalism for its aggressive,
reactionary nature, Brezhnev is now content to state that
2 8"its nature remains the same." In the 22nd and 23rd 
Congress there were many references to "the imperialists'," 
or "the imperialist states and their leaders" when assigning 
blame for warmongering and other assorted unsavory 
activities. In the 25th the international situation is 
certainly not all rosy, but problems in Soviet relations with 
the West are attributed to "influential forces", not the
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state as a whole.
The arms race is said to be intensifying due to the
efforts of aggressive imperialist circles, but the
response is totally different from the 22nd/23rd and says
outright what could be implied from the 24th.
The Soviet Union is not increasing its 
military budget; it is not reducing, but is 
steadily increasing, appropriationsgfor 
improving the people's well-being.
The arms race is condemned for endandering the peace, and on
economic grounds. In connection with a proposal to limit
certain systems Brezhnev says this would increase mutual
confidence, and thus both aid future dealings and lessen the
danger of war. Not surprisingly he declares that the danger
of war has been decreasing, due largely to improved relations
with the U.S. At the same time he issues a warning
concerning U.S. policies that attempt to interfere with
"internal affairs." There is no mention of either the
results of a nuclear war or the damage that would be
incurred.
Since the 20th Congress when Khrushchev announced the 
peaceful coexistence program, all Congresses have supported 
this as what the Soviet Union would prefer. The 22nd and 
23rd basically said that because of Western actions the 
Soviet Union was forced away from this course of action. The 
25th says that although an intense struggle remains, 
relations between the opposing systems have started down the
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path of peaceful coexistence. Vladivostok and Helsinki are
both cited as part of this trend. Most opposition to the
peace path is found in capitalist circles, but internal
opposition is also mentioned.
The transition from the cold war and the 
explosive confrontation of two worlds to the 
easing of tension was connected above all 
with changes in the alignment of forces in 
the world arena. But a great deal of effort 
was required for people— especially those who 
direct state policy— to become accustomed to 
the thought that the natural thing is not 
balancing on the brink of war but 
negotiations on disputed questions, not3Q 
confrontation but peaceful cooperation.
In addition to the emphasis given negotiations, the heralding
of achievements thus far, and endorsement of the peace
program from the 24th Congress, this Congress is the first to
31mention specific weapon systems (Trident and B-l).
26th Congress (1981)
International relations is full of twists and turns.
The glowing possibilities perceived in the 25th Congress 
withered on the vine somewhat by the 26th. The general 
assessment section returns to the "two lines" approach. I 
believe the opponents and proponents of peace and detente are 
clear without repeating this assessment. U.S. military 
spending is once more unprecedented. Washington is accused 
of attempting to upset the strategic balance and to "enmesh 
the world in a web of US bases, airfields and arms 
depots •
41
The arms race remains a major problem but takes on
dimensions never before attributed to it with the
introduction of new (to Party Congress speeches) concepts.
Parity as a desirable goal is clearly endorsed.
The military-strategic equilibrium that 
exists between the USSR and the US and 
between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO 
objectively serves to preserve peace on our 
planet. We have not sought, and do not now 
seek, military superiority over the other 
side. This is not our policy. But neither 
will we allow such superiority to be created 
over us.
The arms race itself is stressed as a danger, without placing
blame on anyone. Although the arms race had been condemned
as a war danger in some previous Congresses it was always in
connection with the imperialists causing the arms race. In
this passage the arms race is presented as a disembodied
phenomenon which the U.S. and Russia must combat together.
The danger of war does indeed hang over the 
US, as it does over all other countries in 
the world. But its source is not the Soviet 
Union, not its mythical superiority, but the 
arms race itself and the continuing tension 
in the world. We are prepared to combat this 
genuine, not imaginary, danger—  hand in hand 
with America, with the European states, with 
all countries on our planet. To try to 
prevail over the other side in the arms race 
or to count on victory in a nuclear war is 
dangerous madness.
The action/reaction phenomenon is recognized somewhat, as is
the idea of the uselessness of a further mutual build-up.
Now for nuclear missiles in Europe. An 
increasingly dangerous stockpiling of these 
weapons is underway. A kind of vicious 
circle has formed: The actions of one side
draw countermeasures ffom the other. How can 
this chain be broken?
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As a result, (of the failure of the Soviet 
proposal to ban Trident and its Soviet 
counterpart) the Americans have created a new 
submarine, the Ohio, armed with Trident-1 
missiles. An analagous system—  the Typhoon 
— has been created in our country. Well, who 
has gained?
The likelihood of war has increased since the 25th
Congress but the real danger is seen as lying in the near
future. Another round in the arms race would "greatly
37increase the danger that war will break out." The effects
of nuclear war are mentioned concerning "limited" nuclear war
in Europe. Such ideas are said to be a "deception."
According to Brezhnev a "limited" nuclear war in Europe would
mean the end of European civilization. "And, needless to
say, the United States itself would be unable to escape the
3 8flames of war."
In the face of increased war danger and the 
unwinnability of nuclear war socialism can still defend 
itself.
The Central Committee reports to the Congress 
that the military- political defensive 
alliance of the socialist countries is 
faithfully serving the cause of peace. It 
has everything necessary to reliably defend 
the peoples' socialist gains. Andgwe will do 
everything to keep this the case!
According to the Soviet explanations of doctrine the 
military view should conform to the political requirements. 
It is not totally accurate to use political statements for 
the political side of doctrine and military statements for
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the military-technical side. A few political statements deal 
with the military side and quite often military statements 
deal with the political side of doctrine. However,the 
general principle that the military works within the 
framework given it by the Party leadership can be tested by 
such a division. Do the military writings parallel the 
political attitude?
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CHAPTER III 
AGREEING TO DISAGREE
The relationship between the military and the party on 
questions of doctrine might be compared to a mother dragging 
a reluctant child through the supermarket. Although there is 
no doubt that the mother is in control, the child accepts as 
little as possible of her control. While the Soviet military 
is not so innocuous as a child it does appear to have a mind 
of its own. New positions or ideas are adopted slowly, and 
do not necessarily follow the Party line. Examples of this 
occur under both Khrushchev and Brezhnev.
It seems to be part of the Soviet style to provide the 
appearance of continuity in thought and action no matter how 
awkward this becomes upon examination. Speaking at the 22d 
(1961) Party Congress Defense Minister Malinovskiy heartily 
praises the doctrine outlined by Khrushchev before the fourth 
session of the Supreme Soviet (Jan. 1960). After 
complimenting Khrushchev on his astute explication of the 
essence of modern warfare Malinovskiy proceeds to disagree 
with him on no less than five crucial points. The points of 
disagreement are:
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1. Surprise.
2. Deterrence.
3. Pre-emption.
4. The value of conventional forces.
5. The likelihood of war occurring.
The appearance of agreement rests upon their common 
endorsement of the following points:
1. Should war occur between the superpowers it will 
inevitably take the form of nuclear rocket war.
2. Such a war would be unprecedented in the scale of 
destruction involved.
3. Said war would destroy capitalism; socialism would 
emerge victorious.
The points of disagreement, though approached
indirectly, are much more substantial. Consider Khrushchev's
statements on the problem of surprise attack.
...could they (imperialists/USA) not 
perfidiously attack us first, in order to 
take advantage of the factor of a surprise 
attack by such terrible weapons as atomic 
rockets and thereby gain an advantage for 
ensuring victory? No. The present-day means 
of warfare do not give such advantages to any 
side.
The state that has been suddenly 
attacked— if, of course, it is a sufficiently 
large state— will always be able to give the 
aggressor a proper rebuff.
We are establishing such a system that 
if some means of retaliation are destroyed, 
it will always be possible to put others into 
operation and strike targets from reserve 
positions.
In American terminology Khrushchev is advocating a 
deterrent strategy which relies upon the ability to absorb an
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enemy first strike and still retaliate with surviving 
systems, thereby destroying the incentive for a first strike 
and preventing war from occurring. In pure form such a 
strategy does not deal with how to fight or win a war. 
Malinovskiy reaches different conclusions on the importance 
of surprise and supports a very different strategy.
The Presidium of the Party Central 
Committee and the Soviet government have 
called upon us to pay special attention to 
the initial phase of a possible war. The 
reason why this phase is important is that 
the very first massed nuclear blows can to an 
enormous extent predetermine the whole 
subsequent course of the war and result in 
such losses in the rear and in the armed 
forces that the people and country will find 
themselves in an exceptionally difficult 
situation.
A realistic assessment of the picture 
would lead one to believe that what the 
imperialists are preparing is a surprise 
nuclear attack on the U.S.S.R. and the 
socialist countries. Hence Soviet military 
doctrine regards it as the most important, 
the pre-eminent, the first-priority task of 
the armed forces to be in a state of constant 
readiness for effectively repulsing a 
surprise attack by the enemy and thwarting 
his criminal designs.
Malinovskiy assigns crucial importance to surprise where
Khrushchev degrades its role. As a remedy Malinovskiy
recommends a strategy based on preemption, very definitely
opposing the First Secretary.
Consider another pair of quotes from the same speeches, 
first from Khrushchev and then Malinovskiy.
Our state has a powerful rocket
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technology. Given the present development of 
military technologyr military aviation and 
the navy have lost their former importance. 
This type of armament is not being reduced 
but replaced. We have now sharply reduced 
and probably will further reduce and even 
halt production of bombers and other obsolete 
equipment•
In our time a country's defense 
capacity is determined not by the number of
soldiers it has under arms, ....  a
country's defense capacity depends to a 
decisive extent on the firepower and means of 
delivery it has.
Although nuclear weapons will hold the 
decisive place in a future war, we are 
nevertheless coming to the conclusion that 
final victory over an aggressor can be 
achieved only through combined operations by 
all branches of the armed forces...
We also believe that under modern 
conditions any future war would be waged, 
despite enormous losses, by mass, many- 
millions-strong armed forces.
The disagreement is obvious. While agreeing on the
importance of the nuclear rocket weapon each draws very
different meaning from its importance, and different ideas on
force composition. On the very basic, and supposedly
accepted, principle of war no longer being inevitable,
Malinovskiy manages to disagree without actually violating
the principle. Khrushchev points out that the imperialists
have no advantage, even if surprise is achieved, and
therefore an attack is most unlikely. Malinovskiy insists
that surprise is a tremendous advantage, and that the West is
preparing to launch a surprise nuclear strike. Last but not
least, Khrushchev refers to the economic aspects of the
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nuclear arms race while Malinovskiy shows no interest in this 
consideration, preferring to concentrate on the overwhelming 
need to prepare for a nuclear war at any cost.
Rather than isolated examples I think these two 
speeches are representative of the views held and 
consistently presented by their respective authors and the 
groups they represent. Presented by Scott as complementary 
views, with Malinovskiy merely "fleshing out" Khrushchev's 
general statements, these speeches can be deceptive. My 
examination illustrates that agreement is only skin deep, 
while at the heart of matters two diametrically opposing 
views are being presented.
Brezhnev never advocated the minimum deterrent view 
that Khrushchev promoted; he initially preferred a military 
buildup. While at least initially interested in strengthing 
the military, Brezhnev had his differences with the military 
view. At the 23rd Congress (1966) he repeated the idea that 
a nuclear war would be the end of capitalism, but that was 
the last Congress to mention it. At the later Congress 
sessions, references to the value of arms control 
negotiations take the place of the conspicuously absent 
condemnations of capitalist efforts to start a nuclear war 
and assertions of socialist superiority.
The 24th Congress (1971) makes no stronger statement 
than this: "We cannot consider that the threat of a new
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world war has been fully eliminated." In a Jan. 1977
speech at Tula Brezhnev declared:
The Soviet Union's defense potential should 
be sufficient to deter anyone from disturbing 
our peaceful life. Not a course aimed at 
superiority in armaments but a course aimed 
at their reduction, at lessening nuclear 
confrontation — that is our policy.
The military continued to think the unthinkable. What 
if deterrence fails? How do we fight and win? In y.I„
Lenin and Soviet Military Science* published in 1981 (2nd 
ed), Colonel (ret.) N.N. Azovetsev sees, a "firm foundation 
for attaining victory," a need for superiority of forces, and 
the "fact" that the West is plotting a surprise first
7
strike.
Marshall Ogarkov's entry on military strategy in the
1979 Soviet Military Encyclopedia sounds very similar to
statements of more than a decade earlier.
Soviet military strategy proceeds from the 
fact that if a nuclear war is foisted upon 
the 'Soviet Union, then the Soviet people and 
their armed forces must be ready for the most 
severe and prolonged trials. In this case 
the Soviet Union and the fraternal Socialist 
states will, compared with the imperialist 
states, possess certain advantages resulting 
from their just war aims and the progressive 
nature of their social and state order. This 
provides them with objective possibilities 
for achieving victory. However, in order for 
these possibilities to be realized, the 
timely and all-around preparation of the « 
country and the armed forces is necessary.
It seems clear that the standard Soviet explanation of
53
doctrine being primarily determined by its political side, 
with the military-technical side solving problems posed by 
the political/ is not accurate. From the beginning there has 
been a military-political divergence/ or perhaps 
preoccupation with different questions. The labels "military 
view" and "political view" serve a useful purpose but can be 
misleading. Like the Malinovskiy speech/ military works 
often endorse the political position initially and then seem 
to contradict it later on. While it is expected that 
political speeches will contain a certain amount of double 
talk, military doctrine and strategy are supposed to be part 
of a unified system of views and aims officially adopted by 
the state. However/ this is untrue not only in the 
political/military sense, but in the lack of a consistent 
military view. While disagreements from book to book 
certainly exist, perhaps the most striking examples of 
conflict come from within single works.
Examining Sokolovskiy’s Military Strategy for the 
definition and direction it should give on defense matters is 
singularly unsatisfying. The importance of the initial 
period is stressed most heavily? yet a surprise attack is 
not seen as fatal to the Soviet Union, thus Malinovskiy and 
Khrushchev are combined. After stressing the need for a 
quick victory the necessity of preparing for a prolonged 
struggle is noted, again showing compromise and not decision.
"Decisive military results" are expected from the
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initial exchanges of nuclear rockets, yet victory will
require "massive multi-million armed forces." For the two
main tasks, destruction of the enemy forces and
disorganization of his rear, no priority is given. Both
tasks are to be pursued and achieved simultaneously. In a
word, no choices are made. Sokolovskiy, the center piece of
Soviet writings on this subject, has been accurately
g
described as a "grand compromise."
If Sokolovskiy shows fractures in the military view, 
Admiral Gorshkov's Seapower of the State illustrates another 
sort of difficulty in Soviet writings.
In the course of the First World War, 
despite the growth of the scale of military 
operations at sea, the fleet became 
relatively less important. A similar 
position, despite the further rise in the 
scale of armed conflict at sea, may also be 
noted in the Second World War. As is known, 
in the course of it a decisive role was 
played by the struggle on the Soviet-German
land front Thus, analysis of the
present-day alignment of forces in the 
international arena and the swift development 
of navies in the post-war period give grounds 
for asserting that the importance of the 
struggle at sea has grown and will continue 
to increase.
The Second World War showed the increased 
significance of armed struggle at sea and the 
strengthened link between military actions 
and operations on land with actions at sea. 
This reconfirmed views on the need for the 
comprehensive development of the fleet as an 
essential,part of the armed forces of the 
country.
There are two notable oddities in these passages. The
55
first concerns the opposing views of naval contributions to 
WW II. The second is that the same end is reached in each 
case; namely that navies today are more vital than ever.
Gorshkov is sometimes seen as the prime naval proponent 
in an ongoing debate on military priorities. While he 
certainly does promote the navy, one quality of a debate is 
missing. Rather than argue for a choice between two 
alternatives something is argued for and nothing against.
For example, Gorshkov argues for SLBMs but does not disparage 
ICBMs. It seems to be a live-and-let-live situation among 
the different branches of the military, with each promoting 
itself without attacking the others.
In more recent years conflict in doctrine seems to have 
increased as a result of changing views. The change to 
considering a purely conventional war possible seems to be at 
odds with the assertions that should a war occur it will be a 
decisive clash between opposing socio-political systems.
Given the manner in which capitalism is pictured, it is 
inconsistent to propose that a "decisive” victory is possible 
without any nuclear weapons being used.
In spite of the incongruity both ideas occur in 
Military-Technological Progress, and the. USSR Armed Forces, 
edited by Lt. General M. Kir'yan, published in 1982.
Possibly Kir'yan had little faith in the chances of a war 
remaining conventional himself. While mentioning that
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conventional war is a possibility, the subsequent elaboration
of how a future war would be fought assigns a primary role to
nuclear weapons.
For their (main missions of theatre forces) 
rapid implementation, it will be essential to 
make full use of the results of mass nuclear 
strikes by strategic weapons.
If one plans the use of conventional forces around the
use of nuclear forces aiding them it is difficult to see how
the war could remain conventional. The continued primacy of
the nuclear weapon also contradicts the declared Soviet
policy of no first use, which Marshall Ogarkov had endorsed 
13by 1979. While change is occurring in Soviet doctrine I 
would not expect consistency to result from it.
Disagreement could be nothing more than part of a 
healthy intellectual process by which new and more refined 
doctrinal positions are developed, but this does not seem to 
be the case. I think that doctrine/strategy is not thought 
out from beginning to end in an objective manner, but from 
end to beginning. Each author knows what end he seeks and 
has only to backtrack to the proper "starting assumptions" to 
lead him to his goal. It seems doctrine is not made 
primarily for its supposed purpose of having a doctrine, but 
for some other unspecified reasons.
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CHAPTER IV 
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
It seems that the content of Soviet doctrine is not 
very well explained as the state approved position on future 
wars. Why then is doctrine written? What goals are the 
authors pursuing? For what reason is one position preferred 
over another?
There are several possible goals and I think this 
accounts for many of the inconsistencies in Soviet doctrine. 
Rather than being a single set of views for a single purpose 
it seems that several purposes are being served, resulting in 
several views. In the American literature on Soviet doctrine 
I encountered several ideas about what purpose lurks behind 
the facade of doctrine. A distillation of the more plausible 
ideas is presented here.
The propaganda dimension is easily noticed when read 
from a Western perspective. The standard line that the USSR 
cannot be dealt with from "positions of strength" seems 
directed outward rather than inward. This statement was much 
more common in the period of marked Soviet inferiority and 
fairly accurate. The Soviets were not very interested in
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arms control until they had equality of a sort with the U.S. 
Military works often include descriptions of the horror and 
fantastic casualty figures of a projected nuclear war, but 
always refer to such damage occurring in the West. In those 
cases where it is conceded that the USSR would suffer 
terribly in a nuclear war the detailed observations remain 
reserved for the opponent. Speaking more directly are the 
pointed observations that should the U.S. attempt a limited 
(territorily) nuclear war, the U.S. itself would not escape 
destruction. Assertions that any superpower war would 
inevitably become a general nuclear war could also be seen as 
more of a warning than a prediction.
The psychological element could be seen as a 
subdivision of the propaganda element. To prevent an attack 
from occurring it is necessary not only to be strong but to 
let the opponent know about it. Just having nuclear bombs is 
not sufficient. The proper resolve to use them must be shown 
so a verbal and printed assault is launched to strengthen the 
defenses•
In an extreme version of this idea Robert Dickson Crane 
suggests that doctrine no longer serves its military function 
of providing guidance but has become a weapon itself, a 
psychological weapon.* According to this view, statements 
concerning victory in a nuclear war are intended to paralyze 
American will to act by convincing the U.S. that the Soviets 
actually would resort to nuclear war rather than be thwarted
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in their aims. This is the obverse of viewing American 
nuclear might as deterring Soviet adventurism. Soviet 
doctrine is seen as an attempt to convince the U.S. that our 
deterrent will not deter them because they have their own 
deterrent to deter our deterrent.
The difficulty encountered here is in trying to 
determine if nuclear strength is capable of conferring any 
benefits on the owner other than the ability to deter a first 
strike by the other side. This idea pictures the threat of 
nuclear war as a game of nerves on an international scale.
The object is to intimidate the other player into not 
interfering with your objectives even though he has the 
capability to do so. If the game is thought of as Russian 
roulette then Soviet doctrine would be the Soviet player 
appearing to put another bullet in the revolver before 
handing it to the American player.
This concept explains doctrinal contradictions as in 
the nature of "psychostrategy." Each threat exerts a 
different pressure on the enemy so that what is militarily 
contradictory becomes complementary in psychostrategy. An 
example could be the emphasis on both long and short war 
preparations, or the need for both massive armies and nuclear 
rockets. This perspective has some merit since deterrence 
rests on perceptions of capabilities and intentions, not 
reality.
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An interesting observation can be made by comparing the 
propaganda and psychological views. A small change in the 
assumed intent renders radically different views of a 
proposed action, but both masquerade as deterrence. The 
propaganda view is defensive, warning the U.S. of harsh 
penalties should we attack. The psychological view depicts 
deterrence as allowing Soviet action by intimidating the 
U.S. out of any counteraction? an offensive purpose is 
served. In Soviet writings it is often the U.S. that is 
depicted as attempting to compel the USSR into a certain 
course of action, rather than protecting the U.S. from 
aggression. It seems that defense (or deterrence) is in the 
eyes of the beholder.
The propaganda aspect assumes that the primary intended 
audience of doctrine is a foreign opponent. Another view 
places doctrine in the field of ideology and thus assumes an 
internal audience is targeted. Undoubtedly ideology plays a 
role of some sort as is evidenced by the many works with 
titles such as Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army.
Many works of doctrine open with the much overquoted 
Clausewitz followed by some gem from the venerable V.I.
Lenin. Because of the very general nature of such opening 
statements and the considerable manipulative skill of Soviet 
writers the opening lines give no clue as to what might 
follow from them (similar to the Malinovskiy speech examined 
earlier). Ideology provides a loose, general framework
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within which many different doctrines could develop. Some 
points of doctrine may be tailored to fulfill ideological 
desiderata, but who decides which ones and what the proper 
Marxist position should be?
Much discussion in Soviet works and American analysis 
of them centers around the nature of modern war and the 
possibility of victory in a nuclear war. Often the Soviet 
discussions revolve around Clausewitz as interpreted by 
Lenin. The key issue is how to apply the idea that war is 
the continuation of politics by violent means to the nuclear 
era.
One view is to contend there has been no change, that 
war remains a political tool now, as it always has been.
This view is usually held by those who also believe that 
victory is possible in a nuclear war, and that nuclear 
weapons are really just better versions of conventional 
artillery and aerial bombs. View number two asserts that 
"war can only be the continuation of madness". This view 
asserts that Clausewitz is obsolete in the nuclear age, and 
is held by those supporting a deterrent strategy and the 
impossibility of victory in a nuclear exchange. A third 
avenue is to attempt a reconciliation of the previous two 
views. Here it is recognized that war is a tool of politics, 
but that it has been robbed of its usefulness by nuclear 
weapons and no longer represents a sane (possibly beneficial) 
policy option.
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As is often the case the supposed subject, Clausewitz, 
is not really the heart of the discussion. His views serve 
as a starting point for advocacy of different defense 
postures. According to Raymond Garthoff the "real" question 
is what should the state do concerning nuclear war. Is a 
deterrent-only force sufficient or should a war-fighting 
capability be pursued? Differing interpretations of
Clausewitz merely provide a forum for these questions, and
2
are not really concerned with Clausewitz at all. Another 
way in which ideology has been involved is in the Sino- 
Soviet polemics of the I960*s. The Chinese accused the 
Soviets of revisionism and the Soviets, anxious to appear as 
the true torch- bearer to other Marxist nations, were careful
not to promote any nuclear war ideas that violated Marxist
. i 3 principles•
While Soviet doctrine naturally has a Marxist flavor, 
this by no means determines the final content. Ideology 
could be equally supportive of either a minimum deterrent 
strategy or a superiority seeking/ war-fighting strategy, as 
is evidenced by the Khrushchev/ Malinovskiy speeches examined 
earlier. Ideology serves as a legitimizing factor and gives 
a veneer of continuity to underlying doctrinal changes. It 
seems that no matter what changes are made doctrine remains 
faithful to the true Leninist principles.
There is a tension between the ideological and the 
propaganda aspects. Consider the frequently used "positions
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of strength" line as propaganda. The implication, and
reality at the time it was most heavily used, is that the
Soviet Union was in an inferior position. While propaganda
addresses itself to minimizing this recognized disadvantage
by denying its usefulness to the U.S., ideology plays up the
superiority of Soviet society as though there was no
disadvantage. "Firsts" statements are a popular method of
doing this and sometimes stretch the truth a little; such as
claiming to test the first hydrogen bomb (technically true
‘since the U.S. test had been a "device" exploded on the
4
ground, not dropped from a plane).
Often pieces on doctrine seem to be directed to a
specific internal group rather than a general audience.
Military authors have at least two reasons to direct
statements to top Party officials; institutional
self-interest and concern for national security. Stanley
Sienkiewicz points out that "these analytically distinct
motivations are unlikely to be clearly separated in the
5
military mind." The generals are likely to truly have 
national interests at heart but to also believe that what is 
good for the armed forces is good for the country. A more 
cynical version of this same view is to assume the desire for 
further build-ups is not security related even in the minds 
of the brass, but is purely selfish. Either way the main 
point is that doctrine is seen as a tool for advancing 
political fortunes rather than adding to the storehouse of 
military knowledge.
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Assuming doctrinal writings are targeted to specific 
internal groups often leads to the explanation of 
contradictions as the result of an internal debate. The 
participants can be classed in a number of ways. One method 
is by stated policy preference and another is by 
institutional affiliation. The policy preference method uses 
a classification scheme such as radical/ centrist/ 
traditional. This is often difficult since an author often 
squeezes several views into one article, making it necessary 
to decide which he really means. Americans who use this 
approach often disagree among themselves on how to classify 
any given Soviet writer.**
The institutional approach highlights the way in which 
actors in the debate support views which benefit their parent 
institution. The results indicate that a large part of the 
debate falls along institutional lines. One objection to 
viewing disagreements as a debate over a specific point (such 
as the possibility of victory) is the extremely long 
time-frame over which the same disagreements persist. 
Disagreement over the possibility of victory in nuclear war 
may still exist. A twenty year debate on this point does 
seem unlikely. However, if the real point of disagreement is 
not the possibility of victory, but the budget priority of 
the defense effort, then it is easy to see that it would be a 
perennial problem, not subject to a once-and-for-all 
solution.
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Whether for self interest or national interest, some 
writings are clearly devoted to promoting the armed forces, 
or a portion thereof. A widely known example is Admiral 
Gorshkov who has written articles and books promoting the 
Navy since the 1960's. Gorshkov makes a good case for why a 
superpower needs a supernavy. Statements by Gorshkov to the 
effect that nuclear submarines are the best platform for 
nuclear missiles and should thus recieve the main strategic 
missions find scant support in other publications.
His book, The Seapower of the State, provides a good 
example of the type of "debate” that occurs in the military 
press. The book unabashedly supports a large navy capable of 
performing all naval missions and explains in detail the many
uses of a navy in peace and war, but he never denigrates the
other services.
Doctrine is viewed as the "blueprint" of future war 
plans by some authors, such as Richard Pipes. This view 
usually considers only military works, dismissing political 
statements as unreliable. Pipes feels that many works 
plainly leave the impression that the Soviet Union considers 
nuclear war a viable policy option. Citing Sokolovskiy and 
other Soviet authors Pipes concentrates on the traditional 
elements of Soviet doctrine which see nuclear war as
essentially the same as all other wars.
From the Russian historical experience, Pipes draws a
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people willing to use any means of coercion available to
them, and depicts nuclear weapons as just another means of
coercion and violence, to be used as necessary for achieving
goals. Pipes believes that Soviet doctrine clearly rejects
mutual deterrence altogether. Intent is the number one issue
with Pipes, and he feels that the Clausewitzian conception of
war rules out a deterrent based strategy. In closing his
article Pipes says:
Above all, however, looms the question of 
intent: as long as the Soviets persist in
adhering to the Clauswitzian maxim on the 
function of war, mutual deterrence does not 
really exist. And unilateral deterrence is 
feasible only if we understand the Soviet 
war-winning strategy7and make it impossible 
for them to succeed.
Determining intent is indeed the object of many forays 
into the forest of doctrine, but as I have suggested here it 
can not be determined? it can only be speculated upon. 
Speculation is a more or less endless endeavor, but some 
speculations have a much firmer hold on observable reality 
than others.
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CONCLUSIONS
My objectives have been to establish that there are 
competing ideas on nuclear war in the Soviet Union, suggest 
why this is so, and show how these ideas have changed over 
time. Most important is the demonstrated divergence of 
military and political figures on nuclear doctrine. Unless 
one accepts the idea that either political or military 
statements should not be considered as doctrine it would seem 
that Soviet doctrine is rife with disagreement.
There are clearly distinguishable views between the 
military and the party leaders. Both Soviet and American 
authors sometimes explain this by differentiating among the 
areas of study (doctrine, strategy, military science, etc.) 
and how disagreement in some areas is natural. It can be 
useful to separate these areas, but often it merely serves to 
confuse the issue and allow two opposing viewpoints to exist 
as though they were one. I have compared statements by 
subject matter, not by the category of study they supposedly 
fall within. Attitudes on the possibility of victory in 
nuclear war are comparable regardless of where they occur.
My labeling of the main views as "political" and 
"military" might suggest a struggle between the party leaders
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and the military establishment. This study does not deal 
directly with the internal politics of the Soviet Union and 
does not pretend to define the internal power of the 
military. As stated earlier, I assume the party has full 
control of the government, but that within the framework of 
government the military does exercise some independence of 
thought and action. The struggle suggested is not over who 
slices the economic pie, but how big a slice the military is 
to receive. The question changes from "is there & Soviet 
doctrine", to "is Soviet doctrine composed of military 
treatises or political tracts."
It should be evident that I have come to the conclusion 
that politics seems to be the game more so than soldiering. 
This is not surprising in one sense, considering that 
doctrine is said to be primarily political by Soviet 
definitions. What the definitions do not account for is that 
the military is not just a political tool to be picked up and 
discarded at will, but a political actor which interacts with 
the other actors. Doctrine is one means of such interaction.
In review of the two sides of doctrine I think the main 
feature of the military view is its adherence to traditional 
military thought with its assumption of possible victory, 
the need for superiority, and the possibility of defending 
one's home territory. The major change in warfare 
attributed to nuclear weapons is the ability to accomplish
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strategic missions directly and immediately. Large 
conventional forces are still seen as necessary, perhaps even 
more so since nuclear war would greatly increase casualty 
rates•
Considering only military works I think there is little 
interest in plotting an aggressive war; the preference is to 
prepare for unspecified future contingencies. The focus of 
the early (1960's) military writings is very heavily weighted 
to nuclear weapons. The only type of war to receive more 
than a mention is world nuclear war. At this time the Soviet 
Union was only beginning to build a large nuclear force. If 
war plans were the case I would expect the emphasis to be on 
how to employ the weapons available, not on needs for the 
future.
What does happen is a shift to more consideration of 
conventional war possibilities and new conventional weapons. 
This occurs after a large nuclear capability has been 
attained. Again, war plans seems to rank low while general 
preparation for an unknown, but possibly hostile, future 
seems likely.
The political view varies more over time than the 
military but there are constants below the surface. In one 
way or another the political view always argues that nuclear 
weapons have introduced radical changes in military affairs 
which render the traditional military view obsolete. Whereas
73
the military view provides no criteria for optimal force 
size, the political view attempts to define and limit what 
forces are necessary.
In a sense this corresponds to the Soviet definitions 
of doctrine and military science. Being politically 
determined, doctrine must consider economics and political 
expediency whereas military science deals only with how to 
prepare for and fight wars.
The major trend over time of the political view is 
abandoning consideration of victory in nuclear war, and an 
ever stronger endorsement of negotiations to control nuclear 
weapons. The pursuit of superiority gives way to proclaiming 
parity as the proper relationship between the superpowers. I 
think this view shows a desire to possess military power, but 
to do so for a minimal price.
The military view changes the type of war considered 
more than anything else. From initial concentration on full 
scale nuclear war there is a move to considering the 
possibilities of national liberation wars, and eventually to 
war between the superpowers remaining territorily limited or 
completely conventional. The opinion that victory is 
possible in nuclear war occurs less and less over the years 
and may have now disappeared, but can be found as recently as 
1982.1 Perhaps there is a relationship between these 
trends.
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One of the early military objections to considering 
nuclear war unwinnable was that to do so destroyed the raison 
d'etre of the military and undermined morale. Now that the 
unwinnability of nuclear war is widely accepted (outside the 
military) the military may be reasserting its importance by 
concluding that a war need not be nuclear (remember that the 
original formulation by Khrushchev adopted universally until 
about 1980 was that war was not inevitable, but should war 
occur it would inevitably be a world nuclear war). If the 
imagined war could remain conventional then all the old rules 
about victory and the need for superiority would apply, and 
the military would maintain its importance.
Along these lines the recent dismissal of
Chief-of-Staff Ogarkov is very interesting. On May 9th 1984
he gave an interview to the newspaper Red Star, in which he
adopted the view that the certainty of retaliation makes
nuclear war highly unlikely, but also stated that the next
war would probably be fought with high-tech conventional
forces. He implied that for an effective defense of the
Soviet Union increased attention and funds must be devoted to
new conventional technologies. On 12 Sept. 1984, Ogarkov was
2
dismissed for "unpartylike tendencies."
If the line of thought presented here is correct, 
within the next few years Soviet doctrine will show a greatly 
increased interest in conventional war and new conventional 
technologies. The amount of money invested in pursuing such
75
programs will indicate to what degree the military has 
succeeded in defending its status in Soviet society.
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